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Copyright law comprises two opposing principles. The first 
principle, expressed as a proposition, can be put thus: literary 
works are the property of their authors until alienated by them 
and should be treated no differently from other forms of private 
property. The second principle is: literary works are written out 
of other literary works (writers in creative dialogue with their 
forebears) and are thus common property, part of the cityscape 
of the public domain.
The first principle may be defended by a combination of 
arguments about the nature of private property- and the nature 
of literary creativity. While the second principle may likewise be 
defended by a comparable combination, the tendency has been 
to emphasise the specifically literary arguments; there has been 
little support for arguments that would circumscribe   or, more 
radically, deny   the claims of private property in general.
These principles are, each one of them, persuasive and 
coherent. Copyright law, by contrast, is neither. Diminished by 
its embrace of both principles, faithful to neither, it leaves its 
constituencies   authors, publishers and readers   dissatisfied. 
If it is to be defended, it has to be on policy grounds. It 
represents a settlement, not a deduction. It is not derived from 
an examination of the question: what is the nature of literary 
creativity? Instead the question is: how should the claim of the 
author to perpetual copyright and the claim of the public to 
instant and unrestricted access be balanced? There is thus no 
place in its final formulations for the triumphant declaration, 
quod erat demonstrandum! One consequence of this is that 
copyright law is unstable and subject to revision. It is always 
going to be open to the objection that it gives undue weight to
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one or other competing interest. In this passage from principle 
to interest, which is a decline in theoretical standing, theo
potential rationality of copyright law is sacrificed.
Because copyright law is thus a politically rather than 
intellectually contested terrain, not grounded in one principle 
but in a plurality of incompatible principles, it tends not to 
attract the attention of jurists (compare contract law or criminal 
law). This is because it is an obvious mess and thus hardly 
conducive to jurisprudential inquiry other than of a 
deconstructive kind in which its various incoherences are held 
up to critical scrutiny; see, for example, the essay by Fiona 
Macmillan Patfield in the volume under review. It does 
increasingly attract, however, the attention of literary critics and
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it is an obvious candidate for study by those concerned with the 
emerging 'law and literature' discipline. This is the case, I 
believe, for three reasons.
First, because it regulates the production of literary works, it 
determines what can, and cannot, be written (or published, at
any rate) no less decisively than more conventional censorship 
laws. In a sense, it determines the literary critic's field of study. 
To adopt the language of proscription, we might say that 
plagiarising works are censored by copyright laws. Indeed, this 
censorship is of a radical nature; it does not merely deny the 
plagiarist the right to publish his work, it actually refuses to 
acknowledge the work's existence. It declares the work to be a 
mere copy of another work. Herein lies the distinctness of 
copyright as censorship: while most censorship laws suppress 
the dangerous (or what is perceived to be so), copyright law 
suppresses the phony. But in doing so, it makes discriminations 
which may not be accepted by literary criticism.
This leads to the second reason for the literary study of 
copyright. While sensible critics seek to avoid consideration of 
the tedious and irresolvable question of precedence   which 
came first, aesthetic doctrine or positive law, the theory of 
literary creativity or the practice of copyright protection?   the 
examination of the ideology of literature implicit in copyright 
law (an ideology which is not to be reduced to the banal worship 
of originality) can lead to worthwhile results. Patrick Parrinder's 
essay in this volume points in just this direction.
Third, and rather more prosaically, it affects the kind of 
research that may be undertaken by critics and the constraints 
on their teaching. While universities may be in practice a 
'copyright-free zone', there is still great resentment at the 
restrictions on the copying of, and the general lack of 
inexpensive access to, canonical modern works, especially when 
those works are actually unavailable. Often the problem is not, 
'We don't want to pay for this expensive copyright work' but 
rather, 'We can't get hold of it at all because it is out of print, so 
we have to copy it from a library edition.' Copyright laws aren't 
just hard on the plagiarist, they're also hard on the scholar and 
the student.
The papers in this collection, first delivered at a 1994 London 
conference organised by The Centre for English Studies, address
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all these questions with intelligence and moderation. While the 
overall bias of the papers favours the 'public domain' side of the 
argument   that is, the second of the two competing principles 
  the publishers' perspective is also represented. What I missed 
was any extended examination of the relation between moral 
rights and copyright. This is an important relation not least 
because what may be a defence to a copyright claim could 
amount to an admission of culpability in an alternative claim for 
breach of a moral right. The best example is parody. There is a 
moral right to object to derogatory treatment of one's work. 
Such treatment may be a parody, and parodies are protected as 
distinct and non-plagiarising versions of the original parodied 
works.
Overall, an impressive and valuable collection. @
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